Articles Posted in Broker Dealers

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Private equity firms were put on notice last year that they may be subject to registration as broker dealers when David Blass, head of the Division of Markets and Trading at the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), provided his insights at an industry conference.  Since that time, the SEC has published their examination priorities list, which included the presence exams of new registrants, a portion of which would review that status of private equity fund managers under the broker dealer rules.  Following up on this warning to the industry, the SEC has also targeted unregistered brokers for enforcement action.

Recently, at a speech in front of another industry group, Mr. Blass provided further guidance on how a private equity firm might structure its compensation arrangements in order to avoid the need to register as a broker dealer.  Consistent with the advice that Pillsbury has been providing private fund clients for many years, Mr. Blass warned against paying “transaction based” compensation and further suggested that if a private fund employee has “an overall mix of functions,” and sales is one aspect of those duties, it is less likely that the SEC staff would view such an arrangement as one that would require broker dealer registration.  An employee of a private fund manager would not be prohibited from being compensated on the overall success of the firm, and certainly sales of fund securities contribute to that overall success.  But tying compensation to assets raised looks like the traditional broker dealer compensation and should be avoided.

Mr. Blass indicated that the SEC is close to finalizing guidance on issues connected to private fund manager employee compensation.  However, the SEC staff has further to go before providing guidelines to the industry on the broker dealer registration issues posed by deal fees that private equity firms sometimes collect on transactions.  It is unlikely that Mr. Blass will see his initiatives through to completion, as he will soon be joining the staff of the Investment Company Institute where he will one day lobby against his former positions.

If you would like additional background on how the private fund managers came to find themselves in the gray zone of broker dealer registration as a result of paying their employees for performance, you may want to re-visit this article.

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On May 16, 2014, a federal court in Florida entered an Order finding in favor of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) following a trial against four Hunter Wise related companies and their owners on charges that they had fraudulently misrepresented the nature of precious metals transactions that resulted in millions of dollars in customer losses.

Hunter Wise was found to have orchestrated a multi-level marketing scheme in which so-called retail dealers served a sales function for Hunter Wise, soliciting customer accounts. The dealers advertised and claimed that they sold physical metals, including gold, silver, platinum, palladium, and copper, to retail customers on a financed basis and forwarded customer funds to Hunter Wise, whose identity was not disclosed to the customers.  Using deceptive marketing materials provided to them by Hunter Wise, the dealers claimed to arrange loans for the purchase of physical metals and advised customers that their physical metals would be stored in a secure depository.  Customers were then charged “exorbitant interest” on the purported loans and storage fees for the metal they thought they had purchased.  In fact, neither Hunter Wise nor any of the dealers purchased any physical metals, arranged actual loans for their customers to purchase physical metals, or stored physical metals for any customers participating in their retail commodity transactions.  Over 90 percent of the retail customers lost money.

Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, Hunter Wise Services, LLC, Hunter Wise Credit, LLC, and Hunter Wise Trading, LLC and the individuals running the companies, have been ordered to pay, jointly and severally, $52.6 million in restitution to the defrauded customers and to pay a civil monetary penalty, jointly and severally, of $55.4 million, the maximum provided by law.  The CFTC charged Hunter Wise, its principals, and other related parties in December 2012.  The Court found that the principals of Hunter Wise knowingly defrauded more than 3,200 retail customers for more than 16 months, between July 2011 and February 2013, and engaged in fraudulent conduct that was “repeated, callous and blatant.”

In considering the appropriate penalties, the Court noted that the fraudulent scheme was “egregious and recurrent” and “calculated to deceive retail customers.” The Court held that the likelihood of future violations was “strong” given that Hunter Wise principals did not acknowledge any wrongdoing.  Further, the “systematic and pervasive nature” of the fraud necessitated full restitution for all customers who lost money between July 16, 2011 and February 25, 2013.

This case follows a CFTC “Precious Metals Fraud Advisory” alert issued in January of 2012 in which the CFTC indicated that it was aware of an increase in the number of companies offering customers the opportunity to buy or invest in precious metals.  The CFTC’s Consumer Fraud Advisory specifically warned that frequently companies do not purchase any physical metals for the customer, but instead simply keep the customer’s funds.  The Consumer Fraud Advisory further cautioned consumers that leveraged commodity transactions are unlawful unless executed on a regulated exchange.

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As we have previously reported, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has taken a significantly heightened interest in whether people who engage in certain promotional activities on behalf of issuers of securities should be subject to regulation as a broker dealer.  The David Blass speech of April 5, 2013 put hedge fund general partners on notice that certain sales practices undertaken by hedge fund personnel may require registration as a broker dealer.  The SEC has recently followed up this guidance with enforcement action.

On May 15, 2014, the SEC  charged a Tiburon, California based securities salesman for selling millions of dollars in oil-and-gas investments without being registered with the SEC as a broker-dealer or associated with a registered broker-dealer.  The defendant, Behrooz Sarafraz, agreed to settle the SEC charges by paying disgorgement of his commissions, prejudgment interest, and a penalty for a total of more than $22 million.

According to the SEC’s complaint filed in federal court in San Francisco, Sarafraz acted as the primary salesman on behalf of TVC Opus I Drilling Program LP and Tri-Valley Corporation, which were based in Bakersfield, California.   From February 2002 to April 2010, these companies raised more than $140 million for their oil-and-gas drilling venture.  While Sarafraz was raising money for these entities, he was not associated with any broker-dealer registered with the SEC.  The SEC also alleged that Sarafraz worked full-time locating investors for the Opus and Tri-Valley oil-and-gas ventures.  He described the investment program to investors and recommended they purchase Opus partnership interests or securities of Tri-Valley and its affiliated entities.  In return, Sarafraz received commissions that ranged from seven to 17 percent of the sales proceeds that he and members of a sales network generated.  The SEC alleges that Opus and Tri-Valley paid Sarafraz approximately $18.3 million in sales commissions.  He paid approximately $1.9 million to others as referral fees and kept the remaining $16.4 million for himself.

For the two companies for which Sarafraz raised money, this could be just the beginning of the process.  If investors have lost money or would otherwise seek to unwind these transactions, it is possible that the investors could sue the companies and Sarafrax for rescission.  Typically, in a rescission recovery case, the plaintiffs who purchased through the unregistered broker can receive the higher of the current market price of the price that they originally paid for the securities.  Hedge funds and other private companies that use solicitors should take note.

The SEC also charged New York-based Rafferty Capital Markets with illegally facilitating trades for another firm that was not registered as a broker-dealer as required under the federal securities laws.  According to the SEC’s order instituting settled administrative proceedings, Rafferty agreed to serve as the broker-dealer of record in name only for approximately 100 trades in asset-backed securities that were actually introduced by the unregistered firm.  While Rafferty held the necessary licenses and processed the trades, it was the unregistered firm that managed the business.  Five of the firm’s employees became registered representatives with Rafferty but they performed their work in the offices of the unregistered firm, which retained sole authority over their trading decisions and determined their compensation.  Rafferty had no involvement in the trading or compensation decisions while the registered representatives executed the trades through Rafferty’s systems on behalf of the unregistered firm.  Based on the agreement, Rafferty kept 15 percent of the compensation generated by these trades and sent the remaining balance to the unregistered firm.

The SEC’s order found that Rafferty willfully violated Federal securities laws and also willfully aided and abetted and caused the unregistered broker-dealer’s violation of the registration provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.  Rafferty consented to a cease-and-desist order that censures the firm and requires the disgorgement of $637,615 as well as payment of $82,011 in prejudgment interest and a $130,000 penalty.  This case should serve as a cautionary tale for hedge fund and other private fund managers that seek to hire sales people who construct sham arrangements with a broker dealer in order to appear to be in compliance with the broker dealer registration provisions.  Expect more of these types of action from the SEC in the near future.

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The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), on March 31, 2014, announced insider trading charges against two men who allegedly traded on information they overheard from their respective wives.  On April 3, 2014, the SEC announced charges against two friends who traded tips related to an impending acquisition deal.  The spouse cases and friend cases differ with respect to the culpability of the tipper.  In the friend cases, the tipper and the tippees were all aware that they were breaching their duties to maintain the information and not trade on it.  In the spouse cases, the wives were unaware of their husbands’ intentions and actions and had previously informed their husbands of the prohibition on trading on any information gleaned from them.

Friends

The SEC has charged three friends who worked together to trade on nonpublic information related to the acquisition of The Shaw Group by Chicago Bridge & Iron Company.  John W. Femenia was employed by a major investment bank from which he obtained the information about the impending acquisition.  Femenia told his friend Walter D. Wagner the nonpublic information and Wagner passed that information along to Alexander J. Osborn.  Osborn and Wagner proceeded to invest substantially all of their liquid assets based on the information from Femenia.  When the public announcement was made, Wagner and Osborn profited approximately $1 million collectively.

Femenia was charged in December 2012 for knowingly being the source of nonpublic information to a whole insider trading ring.

Wagner settled with the SEC by disgorging all illicit profits and a parallel criminal action against him was announced on April 3rd. The SEC case against Osborn is ongoing.

Family

The SEC charged two men with insider trading, in unrelated cases, for illegally trading on information they obtained from their wives. In each case, the husband overheard his wife on a business call in which market moving information was discussed. The SEC found that both men were aware of the prohibition on trading on the information obtained from their spouses and knowingly violated the duty and profited from the information.

Both men have settled their cases with the SEC and each has agreed to pay more than double the profits realized.

The lessons from these cases apply to any person who may obtain material nonpublic information about public entities that they have a duty to protect. Investment advisers and broker-dealers should be sure their insider trading training and policies address the friends and family issue directly. Employers should remind their employees to be cognizant of who can overhear their phone conversations or potentially see their written communication with clients or co-workers and take as many precautions as practicable to prevent the insider information from being used illegally.

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The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) previously announced that its 2014 Examination Priorities included a focus on technology, including cybersecurity preparedness.  In connection with that statement of examination priority, OCIE recently issued a Risk Alert to provide additional information concerning its initiative to assess cybersecurity preparedness in the securities industry.

As part of this initiative, OCIE will conduct examinations of more than 50 registered broker-dealers and registered investment advisers focused on the following:

  • the entity’s cybersecurity governance,
  • identification and assessment of cybersecurity risks,
  • protection of networks and information,
  • risks associated with remote customer access and funds transfer requests,
  • risks associated with vendors and other third parties,
  • detection of unauthorized activity, and
  • experiences with certain cybersecurity threats.

OCIE has provided a sample form of request for information and documents that investment advisers and broker dealers can expect to receive prior to this type of examination.

Although the SEC has stated that they believe the sample document request (see Appendix) should help to empower compliance professionals with questions and tools they can use to assess their firms’ level of preparedness, registrants should also expect the SEC to use the sample document as a basis for finding deficiencies, to the extent the guidance is not followed.

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Written by: Jessica M. Brown and Jay B. Gould

On March 10, 2014, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (“FINRA”) submitted a proposed rule to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) that would require disclosure to certain clients and FINRA regarding the details of a broker-dealer representative’s financial recruiting incentives (the “Proposed Rule”). The Proposed Rule is intended to ensure that the former clients of a representative who has changed firms are aware of: (i) the recruitment compensation that induced the representative to change firms, and (ii) all of the costs and potential risks associated with transferring their assets to the new firm (the “Recruiting Firm”). In addition to disclosures to clients, the Proposed Rule would require the Recruiting Firm to report to FINRA at the beginning of a representative’s employment, any significant total compensation increases the representative will receive in the first year, compared to the representative’s compensation the prior year.

Under the Proposed Rule, if a Recruiting Firm directly or through the representative, tries to induce the representative’s clients from a prior firm to transfer assets to the Recruiting Firm, the Recruiting Firm would be required to disclose to the potential client if the representative has received, or will receive, $100,000 or more in either (i) aggregate “upfront payments” or (ii) aggregate “potential future payments.” Upfront payments include compensation received upon commencement of association or specified amounts guaranteed to be paid at a future date (e.g. cash, deferred cash bonus, transition assistance, forgivable loans, equity awards, loan-bonus arrangements, or ownership interests. Potential future payments include those offered as a financial incentive contingent upon the representative meeting performance-based goals, allowance for additional travel or expense reimbursement in excess to what is typical for similarly situated representatives, or a commission schedule for a representative who is paid on a commission basis in excess of what is typically provided to similarly situated representatives.  Where the Recruiting Firm partnered with another entity, such as an investment adviser or insurance company, to recruit a representative, the disclosed upfront payments and potential future payments would include any payments from those third parties connected to the recruitment.

The amount of recruitment compensation received would be disclosed separately for aggregate upfront payments and aggregate potential future payments using ranges for each: $100,000 to $500,000; $500,001 to $1,000,000; $1,000,001 to $2,000,000; $2,000,001 to $5,000,000; and above $5,000,000. In addition to the amounts that must be disclosed, the Recruiting Firm would be required to disclose the basis for determining the upfront and potential future payments. Pursuant to the Proposed Rule, disclosure would not be required to be disclosed to clients that meet the definition of an “institutional account” under FINRA Rule 4512(c), however accounts held by natural persons would not qualify for the institutional account exception under the Proposed Rule.

Client disclosures, pursuant to the Proposed Rule, would also be required to include whether transferring assets from the representative’s prior firm to the Recruiting Firm would cause the client to incur any costs the Recruiting Firm would not reimburse. Further, if the assets are not transferrable, the Recruiting Firm would be required to disclose the costs the client may incur, including taxes.

The Proposed Rule would require the disclosures be made to the client at the time of first individualized contact by the representative or Recruiting Firm that attempts to convince the client to transfer assets. Written disclosures would be required if the contact is in writing. If the contact is oral, the disclosures would be made orally with written disclosures to follow. The disclosure requirement would be mandated for the representative’s first year with the Recruiting Firm.

The second component of the Proposed Rule would require the Recruiting Firm to report to FINRA if it reasonably expects the total compensation paid to the representative, in his/her first year, to increase the representative’s prior year’s compensation by the greater of 25% or $100,000. The compensation information reported to FINRA would not be available to the public under the Proposed Rule.

The SEC will review the Proposed Rule and is expected to seek public comment. The Proposed Rule has not yet been published on the SEC’s website as of the date of this posting.

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Written by: Jessica M. Brown

The Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) approved two new Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) rules as part of FINRA’s ongoing rulebook consolidation process. The two new rules approved by the SEC on December 23, 2013 consolidate a number of existing NASD and NYSE rules and interpretations regarding supervision into the new FINRA Rules 3110 and 3120. The new rules will require broker-dealer firms to bring their current supervisory system and written policies and procedures into compliance with a handful of new requirements. Firms should be aware of the impact the new rules have on: (i) which personnel may act in a supervisory role; (ii) who may conduct office inspections; (iii) how certain internal communication must be reviewed; and (iv) additional requirements in regards to monitoring and reporting insider trading.

Supervisory Personnel

FINRA Rule 3110 requires a broker-dealer to have a supervisory system that designates at least one principal on-site to supervise the activities in each of the broker-dealer’s offices of supervisory jurisdiction (“OSJs”). The designated on-site principal for each OSJ must have a “regular and routine” physical presence and, absent certain circumstances, should not be responsible for the supervision of more than one OSJ.

Inspections of Offices

FINRA Rule 3110 requires broker-dealers to, at minimum, inspect (i) supervisory branch offices and OSJs annually, (ii) non-supervisory branch offices every three years, and (iii) non-branch locations (including “home offices”) on a “regular periodic schedule” which period should not be longer than three years.

Conflicts of Interest with Inspections

The new FINRA Rule 3110(c)(3) requires broker-dealers to establish policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to prevent conflicts of interest from compromising office inspections. Broker-dealers may not permit, except under certain special circumstances, an associated person to perform the inspection of a location where that person is assigned to or is directly/indirectly supervised by, or reports to, a person assigned to that location.

Investment Banking/Securities Transactions

New Rule 3110(b)(2) requires a principal to perform a written review of transactions related to the broker-dealer’s securities or investment banking business. The review does not need to be detailed for each transaction if the broker-dealer’s review system meets certain criteria.

Written and Electronic Communication Review

The new FINRA Rule 3110(b)(4) requires supervisory procedures be in place to review written and electronic communications which relate to the broker-dealer’s securities or investment banking. Further, broker-dealers must put procedures in place to review internal communications which may contain subject matter needing to be reviewed for compliance with securities laws and FINRA rules. While the supervisor is ultimately responsible, Rule 3110(b)(4) permits the delegation of certain communication review duties to unregistered personnel.

Insider Trading

In order to identify potential insider trading or other types of manipulative or deceptive devices, new FINRA Rule 3110(d) requires broker-dealers to have procedures in place to supervise the broker-dealer’s transactions and well as those of its associated persons or family members of the associated persons. In the event of a questionable trade, the broker-dealer must promptly perform an internal investigation. If the broker-dealer is engaged in investment banking services, it must supply FINRA with a quarterly report concerning insider trading investigations in the prior quarter, as well as a report within five days of the completion of an internal investigation where violations of insider trading policies were found.

Annual Report

New FINRA Rule 3120 requires broker-dealers to test and verify supervisory procedures and provide senior management with an annual report. Further, the annual report to senior management of a broker-dealer with more that $200 million in gross annual revenue must detail the reports made to FINRA concerning customer complaints and internal investigations, as well as information on the previous year’s compliance procedures.

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Today, the Securities and Exchange Commission published its 2014 priorities for its National Examination Program (“NEP”).  These priorities cover a wide range of issues at financial institutions, including investment advisers and investment companies, broker-dealers, clearing agencies, exchanges and other self-regulatory organizations, hedge funds, private equity funds, and transfer agents.  Similar to the 2013 priorities, the 2014 priorities were published to focus on areas that are perceived by the SEC staff to have heightened risk.

The examination priorities address market-wide issues and those specific to each of the NEP’s four program areas — (i) investment advisers and investment companies(“IA-IC”), (ii) broker-dealers (“B-D”), (iii) exchanges and self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”, and collectively, “market oversight”), and (iv) clearing and transfer agents (“CA” and “TA”).  For investment advisers and investment companies, the SEC has specifically outlined its priorities as follows: 

  • Core Risks
    • Safety of Assets and Custody
    • Conflicts of Interest Inherent in Certain Investment Adviser Business Models
    • Marketing Performance 
  • New and Emerging Issues and Initiatives
    • Never-Before Examined Advisers
    • Wrap Fee Programs
    • Quantitative Trading Models
    • Presence Exams
    • Payments for Distribution in Guise
    • Fixed Income Investment Companies 
  • Policy Topics
    • Money Market Funds
    • “Alternative” Investment Companies
    • Securities Lending Arrangements

The market-wide priorities include fraud detection and prevention, corporate governance and enterprise risk management, technology controls, issues posed by the convergence of broker-dealer and investment adviser businesses and by new rules and regulations, and retirement investments and rollovers. 

The full SEC press release can be found HERE and a full text of the 2014 Examination Priorities can be found HERE. 

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On April 8, 2013, we reviewed a recent speech by David Blass, the Chief Counsel of the Division of Trading and Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), in which Mr. Blass provided his views on whether certain investment fund managers might be operating in a way that would require registration as a broker dealer.  For hedge fund managers, the problem typically arises in the context of paying internal sales people based on the amount of capital raised.  As we noted, the widespread misreading or abuse of Rule 3a4-1, the issuer’s exemption safe harbor on which so many hedge fund managers rely, is now clearly on the SEC’s radar.

But there are other ways to become entangled in broker dealer registration requirements that many private equity funds (and some hedge funds) will also need to consider.  The SEC staff is aware that advisers to some private funds, such as managers of private equity funds executing a leverage buyout strategy, may collect fees other than advisory fees, some of which look suspiciously like brokerage commissions.  It is not uncommon for a fund manager to direct the payment of fees by a portfolio company of the fund to one of its affiliates in connection with the acquisition, disposition (including an initial public offering), or recapitalization of the portfolio company.  These fees are often described as compensating the fund manager or its affiliated company, or personnel for “investment banking activity,” including negotiating transactions, identifying and soliciting purchasers or sellers of the securities of the company, or structuring transactions.  These are typical investment banking activities for which registration as a broker dealer is required.

Perhaps through its presence exams, the SEC staff recognizes that the practice of charging these transaction fees is fairly common among certain private equity fund managers.  Blass suggested that if the payment of these investment banking type fees were used to offset the management fee, then a valid argument could be made that no separate brokerage compensation was generated.  However, the industry argument that the receipt of such fees by the general partner of the fund should be viewed as the same person as the fund, so there are no transactions for the account of others was not an argument that the SEC staff appeared ready to endorse.  As long as the fee is paid to someone other than the fund for the types of activities described above, then the general partner or its affiliate would need to go through the analysis as to why broker dealer registration is not required.  The private equity fund bar has also advanced the policy argument that requiring private equity fund managers to register as broker dealers serves no useful purpose.  This policy argument that advocates the position that the SEC should exempt certain firms and not others for the same conduct, as attractive as it might be for managers of private equity funds, is a total non-starter from the regulator’s perspective.  The SEC staff will remain fixated on the type of activity and the fees generated from that activity when attempting to determine whether registration is required.

Particularly among private equity fund managers, many of which have not had a history of being a regulated entity, this violation of the broker dealer registration requirement is not viewed as a serious matter because “everyone else is doing it.”  But the SEC is putting private equity on notice that this is an area that the staff will focus on in examinations and will eventually bring enforcement action.  In addition to being subject to sanctions by the SEC, another possible consequence of acting as an unregistered broker-dealer is the potential right to rescission by investors.  A transaction that is intermediated by an inappropriately unregistered broker-dealer could potentially be rendered void.  A purchaser of securities would typically seek to void a transaction if the price had moved against him, leaving the fund manager scrambling to make up the difference between the sales price and the value at rescission.   Private equity fund managers and those hedge fund managers that conduct similar activities should give greater attention to this issue for which the SEC staff has provided fair warning.

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In a speech before the American Bar Association’s Trading and Markets Subcommittee on April 5, 2013, David Blass, the Chief Counsel of the Division of Markets and Trading, put hedge fund managers and private equity fund managers on notice that they may be engaged in unregistered (and therefore, unlawful) broker dealer activities as a result of the manner by which hedge fund managers compensate their personnel and, in the case of private equity fund managers, the receipt of investment banking fees with respect to their portfolio companies.  The good news is that Mr. Blass indicated that the Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) is willing to work with the industry to come up with an exemption from broker dealer registration for private fund managers that would allow some relief from the prohibitions against certain sales activities and compensation arrangements regarding the sales of private fund securities.  This post will address only the sales compensation activities of hedge funds with an explanation of the private equity investment banking fee discussion to follow.

Mr. Blass indicated that he believed that private fund advisers may not be fully aware of all of the activities that could be viewed as soliciting securities transactions, or the implications of compensation methods that are transaction-based that would give rise to the requirement to register as a broker dealer.

Mr. Blass provided several examples that fund managers should consider to help determine whether a person is acting as a broker-dealer:

How does the adviser solicit and retain investors?  Thought should be given regarding the duties and responsibilities of personnel performing such solicitation or marketing efforts. This is an important consideration because a dedicated sales force of internal employees working in a “marketing” department may strongly indicate that they are in the business of effecting transactions in the private fund, regardless of how the personnel are compensated.

Do employees who solicit investors have other responsibilities?  The implication of this point is that if an employee’s primary responsibility is to solicit investors, the employee may be engaged in a broker dealer activity irrespective of whether other duties are also performed.

How are personnel who solicit investors for a private fund compensated?  Do those individuals receive bonuses or other types of compensation that is linked to successful investments?  A critical element to determining whether one is required to register as a broker-dealer is the existence of transaction-based compensation. This implies that bonuses tied to capital raising success would likely give rise to a requirement for such individuals to register as broker dealers.

Does the fund manager charge a transaction fee in connection with a securities transaction?  In addition to considering compensation of employees, advisers also need to consider the fees they charge and in what way, if any, they are linked to a security transaction.  This point is aimed more at the investment banking type fees that a private equity fund might generate, but it would also be relevant in the context of direct lending funds or other types of funds that generate income outside of the increase or decrease of securities’ prices.

Mr. Blass also addressed the use or misuse of Rule 3a4-1, the so-called “issuer exemption.”  That exemption provides a nonexclusive safe harbor under which associated persons of certain issuers can participate in the sale of an issuer’s securities in certain limited circumstances without being considered a broker.  Mr. Blass stated his mistaken belief that most private fund managers do not rely on Rule 3a4-1, which, in fact, they do.  Blass suggests that private fund managers do not rely on this rule because in order to do so, a person must satisfy one of three conditions to be exempt from broker-dealer registration:

  • the person limits the offering and selling of the issuer’s securities only to broker-dealers and other specified types of financial institutions;
  • the person performs substantial duties for the issuer other than in connection with transactions in securities, was not a broker-dealer or an associated person of a broker-dealer within the preceding 12 months, and does not participate in selling an offering of securities for any issuer more than once every 12 months; or
  • the person limits activities to delivering written communication by means that do not involve oral solicitation by the associated person of a potential purchaser.

Mr. Blass rightly points out that it would be difficult for private fund advisers to fall within these conditions.  That, however, has not stopped most private fund managers from relying on some interpretation of the “issuer’s exemption” no matter how attenuated the adherence to the conditions might be.

Although Mr. Blass indicated a willingness to work with the industry to fashion an exemption from broker dealer registration that is specifically tailored to private fund sales, he also reminded the audience that the SEC is quite willing to take enforcement action against private funds that employ unregistered brokers.  Last month, the SEC settled charges in connection with alleged unregistered brokerage activities against Ranieri Partners, a former senior executive of Ranieri Partners, and an independent consultant hired by Ranieri Partners.  The SEC’s order stated (whether or not supported by the facts) that Ranieri Partners paid transaction-based fees to the consultant, who was not registered as a broker, for the purpose of actively soliciting investors for private fund investments. This case demonstrates that there are serious consequences for acting as an unregistered broker, even where there are no allegations of fraud.  The SEC believes that a fund manager’s willingness to ignore the rules or interpret the rules to accommodate their activities can be a strong indicator of other potential misconduct, especially where the unregistered broker-dealer comes into possession of funds and securities.

Private fund managers are encouraged to consider this statement and review their sales and compensation arrangements accordingly.